Gregory N.Carlson and Francis Jeffry Pelletier (eds), The generic book.Chicago and London:The University of Chicago Press, 1995, x+463 pp.£30.25/$37.95 (Paper); £83.95/$5105.00 (Cloth).

This paper is concerned with De Morgan’s explanation of the validity of arguments that involve relational notions. It discusses De Morgan’s expansion of traditional logic aimed at accommodating those inferences, and makes the point that his endeavour is not successful in that the rules that made up his new logic are not sound. Nevertheless, the most important scholarly work on De Morgan’s logic, and contrary to that De Morgan’s mistake is not beyond repair. The rules that determine his new logic (...) are in fact monotonie replacement rules. And provided they are restricted in the correct way, these rules are demonstrably sound. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with De Morgan’s explanation of the validity of arguments that involve relational notions. It discusses De Morgan’s expansion of traditional logic aimed at accommodating those inferences, and makes the point that his endeavour is not successful in that the rules that made up his new logic are not sound. Nevertheless, the most important scholarly work on De Morgan’s logic, and contrary to that De Morgan’s mistake is not beyond repair. The rules that determine his new logic (...) are in fact monotonie replacement rules. And provided they are restricted in the correct way, these rules are demonstrably sound. (shrink)

Este artículo pasa revista a las principales contribuciones de Víctor Sánchez de Zavala a la lingüística y a la filosofía, a traves del análisis de las ideas centrales de su pensamiento expuestas en sus libros y artículos. Despues de una breve introdueción a su biografía académica, se analiza y explica el papel esencial que Víctor Sánchez de Zavala tuvo en la introducción de la gramatíca generativa en España. Se examina en este sentido su trabajo corno profesor, (...) editor, traductor y escritor y la Iínea central de su trabajo lingüístico. La segunda parte del artículo analiza las hipótesis fundamentales de la teoda pragmática desarrollada por este filósofo y lingüísta a lo largo de toda su vida. En esta sección, por otra parte, se presenta y discute su novedoso enfoque global de la actividad lingüística expuesta en su obra póstuma, de reciente aparieión: Hacia la pragmática (psicoIógica), Madrid, Visor.This paper reviews Víctor Sánehez de Zavala’s main contributions to linguistics and philosophy through a close look at the central ideas developed in his articles and books. In the first part, after a brief introduction to his academic biography, the leading role of Víctor Sánchez de Zavada in the introduction of formal linguistics in Spain is analysed and justified. His work as editor, professor, translator and writer is examined through his main publications. The second part of the paper is devoted to provide an analysis of the central hypotheses on which this theory of psychologicaI pragmatics is based. Furthermore, this second part examines his novel and global approach to linguistic activity, developed in his posthumous book Towards a psychological pragmatics. (shrink)

ECONOMIA CRIATIVA: CONCEITO E RELAÇÃO COM O DIREITO.

In this comparative study the author accounts for the interpretative bases of 2 Corinthians 13:5. The process of the study follows the following structure: A. Approaching the genesis of the work; B. Diachronic and synchronic reading of the text; C. Pragmatic reading and philosophical applications; D..

The paper reviews statistical models for money, wealth, and income distributions developed in the econophysics literature since the late 1990s. By analogy with the Boltzmann-Gibbs distribution of energy in physics, it is shown that the probability distribution of money is exponential for certain classes of models with interacting economic agents. Alternative scenarios are also reviewed. Data analysis of the empirical distributions of wealth and income reveals a two-class distribution. The majority of the population belongs to the lower class, characterized by (...) the exponential (“thermal”) distribution, whereas a small fraction of the population in the upper class is characterized by the power-law (“superthermal”) distribution. The lower part is very stable, stationary in time, whereas the upper part is highly dynamical and out of equilibrium. (shrink)

In the digital age, the global software development sector has been a forerunner in implementing new ways and configurations for remote teamwork using information and communication technologies on a widespread basis. Crises and technological advances have influenced each other to bring about changes in the ways of working. In the 70’s of the last century, in the middle of the so-called oil crisis, the concept of teleworking was defined using remote computer equipment to access office equipment and thus avoid moving (...) around using traditional vehicles. Then from the 90s, with the advent of communications and the widespread use of the Internet, the first virtual work teams were implemented in software development companies that already had some of the important characteristics needed to work in this way, such as, cultural diversity, characterized tasks, geographical distribution of members, communication, interdependence of tasks, leadership, cohesion, empowerment, confidence, virtuality. This manuscript groups the main factors into different models proposed by the literature and also analyzes the results of a study conducted in the midst of the Covid-19 crisis on 317 software development teams that had to work in virtual teams. The results of the quantitative methodology with structural equation modeling based on variance using the partial least squares route method are analyzed. The results of the research focus on some determinants that can directly affect the performance of the virtual team. A first determinant is communication in relation to the tasks. The second is trust in relation to leadership, empowerment and cohesion. The results of virtual teams provide information that can serve as a basis for future research lines for the implementation of virtual work strategies in post-pandemic work. (shrink)

Attachment -- Awake -- Awareness -- Actions -- Breath -- Buddha -- Chakras -- Change -- Compassion -- Control -- Conversion -- Criticism -- Divinity -- Emotions -- Empathy -- Forgiveness -- Gatha -- Generosity -- Generosity (part 2) -- Happiness -- Humility -- Identifying -- Illusions -- Judging -- Karma -- Karma (part 2) -- Kindness -- Lessons -- Loving-kindness -- Meditation -- Mind -- Namaste -- Nonattachment -- Nonharming -- Nonharming (part 2) -- Openness -- Possessions -- Practice (...) -- Quest -- Reincarnation -- Religion -- Requiring more -- Reverence -- Scripture -- Seeing -- Self -- Spirituality -- Suffering -- Teachers -- Thoughts -- Tonglen -- Transcending -- Treasure -- Tumo -- Understanding -- Virtues -- Worlds -- The mathematic symbol for the unknown -- Xenophilia -- Yoga -- Yoga (part 2) -- Yuga -- Zen. (shrink)

Many scholars are ready to accept that first person thought involves a special way w such that, for any thinker x, only x can access the first person way w of thinking about x. Standard articulations of this Frege-inspired view involve a rejection of the strict shareability of first person thought. I argue that this rejection eventually forces us to renounce an intuitively plausible characterisation of communication, and specifically, disagreement. This result invites us to explore alternative articulations which, still within (...) an overall Fregean framework, may better explain how first person thoughts reach out into a public, shareable dimension. Here I shape this possibility in terms of perspectives, i.e. ways of thinking that do not individuate concepts or thoughts. Perspectives, I submit, can serve to unproblematically accommodate basic disagreement in indexical cases and to outline the dynamic character of first person thought. (shrink)

Consider the Unshareability View, namely, the view that first person thought or self-thought—thought as typically expressed via the first person pronoun—is not shareable from subject to subject. In this article, I show that a significant number of Fregean and non-Fregean commentators of Frege have taken the Unshareability View to be the default Fregean position, rehearse Frege’s chief claims about self-thought and suggest that their combination entails the Unshareability View only on the assumption that there is a one-to-one correspondence between way (...) of thinking and thought-individuating cognitive value, outline an account of self-thought that rejects the assumption and keeps intact all of Frege’s chief claims, and respond to a number of worries to the effect that this proposal yields undesirable results from the point of view of the individuation of self-thought at the level of cognitive value. (shrink)

Subjects suffering from extreme peripheral deafferentation can recruit vision to perform a significant range of basic physical actions with limbs they can’t proprioceptively feel. Self-ascriptions of deafferented action – just as deafferented action itself – fundamentally depend, therefore, on visual information of limb position and movement. But what’s the significance of this result for the concept of self patently at work in these self-ascriptions? In this paper, I argue that these cases show that bodily awareness grounding employment of the self-concept (...) in self-ascriptions of action can be fundamentally third-personal and concern a body that is not presented as one’s own, but as an object among others. (shrink)

Concept-individuating reference rules offer a well-known route for the explanation of immunity to error through misidentification in judgments involving first person or de se thought. However, the ‘outright’ version of this account—one that sanctions a one-to-one correspondence between the reference-fixing rule and immunity—cannot do justice to the unassailable ground-relativity of the target phenomenon. In this paper, I outline a version of the reference-rule account that circumvents this problem. I state a reference rule for the de se concept that makes space (...) for different non-reference-fixing ways of thinking or perspectives, yielding different grounds for judgment. The proposal and its ramifications, I argue, shed light on the variety of ways in which this kind of immunity has been proved to be present—and indeed absent—in de se thought. (shrink)

After more than twenty years of representational debate in the cognitive sciences, anti-representational dynamicism may be seen as offering a rival and radically new kind of explanation of systematicity phenomena. In this paper, I argue that, on the contrary, anti-representational dynamicism must face a version of the old systematicity challenge: either it does not explain systematicity, or else, it is just an implementation of representational theories. To show this, I present a purely behavioral and representation-free account of systematicity. I then (...) consider a case of insect sensorimotor systematic behavior: communicating behavior in honey bees. I conclude that anti-representational dynamicism fails to capture the fundamental trait of systematic behaviors qua systematic, i.e., their involving exercises of the same behavioral capacities. I suggest, finally, a collaborative strategy in pursuit of a rich and powerful account of this central phenomenon of high cognition at all levels of explanation, including the representational level. (shrink)

Actions are uncontroversially public. However, the prevailing model of explanation in the debate about the de se seems to conflict with this fact by proposing agent-specific explanations that yield agent-specific types of action—i.e. types of action that no two agents can instantiate. Remarkably, this point affects both proponents and critics of the de se. In this paper, I present this kind of problem, characterise the proper level of analysis for action explanation compatible with the publicity of action—i.e. the agent-bound level—and (...) suggest that acknowledgement of this level highlights two important amendments of contemporary views. First, sceptics must accept that, when explanation is attitude-involving, the attitudes mentioned in the explanation of action must refer to the agent. Secondly, and perhaps more surprisingly, proponents of the de se should seek for accounts of de se attitudes that are not confined to a specific agent and are, therefore, sharable across agents. (shrink)

Theorists of first person thought seem to be faced with a pervasive dilemma: either accept the view that varying reference and sense are bound up together in first person thought, but then reject person-to-person shareability; or else, maintain the shareability of first person thought or belief at the price of giving up the connection between sense and subject-to-subject changing reference. Here, the author will argue that this is, in fact, a spurious dilemma based largely upon a failure to appreciate, if (...) not the existence, at least the crucial importance of the distinction between types, instantiable types and instantiated types of thought or belief. Only the level of the instantiable type is relevant for a proper assessment of the question of whether two different subjects have the same first person thought. (shrink)

It seems uncontroversial that Dalton wrongly believed that atoms are indivisible. However, the correct analysis of Dalton’s belief and the way it relates to contemporary beliefs about atoms is, on closer inspection, far from straightforward. In this paper, I introduce four features that any candidate analysis is plausibly bound to respect. I argue that theories that individuate concepts at the level of understanding are doomed to fail in this endeavor. I formally sketch an alternative and suggest that cases such as (...) the one presented provide support for the claim that the genuine source for concept individuation is public sharable thought. (shrink)

Ever since John Perry's developments in the late 70s, it is customary among philosophers to take de se contents as essentially tied to the explanation of action. The target explanation appeals to a subject-specific notion of de se content capable of capturing behavioural differences in central cases. But a subject-specific de se content leads us, I argue, to a subject-specific notion of intentional action that prevents basic forms of generalisation. Although this might be seen as a welcome revision of our (...) pre-theoretical conceptions, I propose, instead, a strategy to circumvent this rather unexpected result: to reject subject-specific de se contents in favour of subject-specific ways of thinking that do not enter into the content of one's attitudes. (shrink)

Recent philosophical developments on personal indexicals reveal a disagreement between those who defend and those who deny the existence of a distinctive class of second person thoughts. In this piece, I tackle this controversy by highlighting two crucial constraints based on paradigmatic felicitous singular uses of the second person pronoun. On the one hand, the Addressing Constraint is brought out by the awareness and action capabilities displayed in successfully addressing another. On the other hand, the Merging Constraint arises, among other (...) things, from the fact that ‘I’/‘you’-exchanges ground intersubjective disagreement. Once these constraints are fully in view, I go on to show that they pose a challenging dilemma for any account of the second person and that the chasm between friends and foes of the distinctness of second person thought is better seen as endorsements of one of the horns of the dilemma. In reaction to this, I outline a way of accommodating both constraints in terms of ‘perspectives’, i.e. ways of thinking of a reference that do not individuate a thought. On the recommended approach, the second person perspective is cognitively distinctive but does not itself signal the existence of a distinctive second person type of thought. By contrast, a single type of thought about selves expressible with personal indexicals—the self-thought type—can be shown to comprise the third, the second and, perhaps surprisingly, the first person perspective. Unlike other perspectival approaches, the here proposed analysis relies on an elucidation of perspectives in terms of specific information on which a thinker draws made available by a concept-individuating reference rule. (shrink)

La narración común sobre la metafísica de Francisco Suárez entre un grupo diverso de pensadores es que el jesuita presenta una ontología «indiferente» que descuida la concepción medieval tradicional de Dios como absolutamente trascendente y única. Aunque las críticas dirigidas contra Suárez son legiones e igualmente diversas como las críticas de las que derivan, tal como yo lo entiendo, hay una convicción común a todas ellas, aunque no expresada, de que el pensamiento del jesuita finalmente resulta en la secularización de (...) la metafísica. Por «secularización» me refiero a que, como se afirma con frecuencia, el análisis de Suárez sobre la naturaleza del ser ocurre por completo sin la necesidad de advertir sobre ningún marco teológico general. En este ensayo, cuestiono ese punto de vista y sostengo que la metafísica de Suárez está completamente determinada por su visión teológica y su proyecto. (shrink)

In the light of partial understanding, we examine the thesis that concepts are individuated in terms of possession conditions and show that adherents face a fatal dilemma: Either concept-individuating possession conditions include cases of partially understood concepts or not. If yes, possession conditions do not individuate concepts. If no, the thesis is too restricted and lacks a minimally satisfactory level of generalization.

Recent philosophical developments on personal indexicals reveal a disagreement between those who defend and those who deny the existence of a distinctive class of second person thoughts. In this piece, I tackle this controversy by highlighting two crucial constraints based on paradigmatic felicitous singular uses of the second person pronoun. On the one hand, the Addressing Constraint is brought out by the awareness and action capabilities displayed in successfully addressing another. On the other hand, the Merging Constraint arises, among other (...) things, from the fact that ‘I’/‘you’-exchanges ground intersubjective disagreement. Once these constraints are fully in view, I go on to show that they pose a challenging dilemma for any account of the second person and that the chasm between friends and foes of the distinctness of second person thought is better seen as endorsements of one of the horns of the dilemma. In reaction to this, I outline a way of accommodating both constraints in terms of ‘perspectives’, i.e. ways of thinking of a reference that do not individuate a thought. On the recommended approach, the second person perspective is cognitively distinctive but does not itself signal the existence of a distinctive second person type of thought. By contrast, a single type of thought about selves expressible with personal indexicals—the self-thought type—can be shown to comprise the third, the second and, perhaps surprisingly, the first person perspective. Unlike other perspectival approaches, the here proposed analysis relies on an elucidation of perspectives in terms of specific information on which a thinker draws made available by a concept-individuating reference rule. (shrink)

Marr’s celebrated contribution to cognitive science (Marr 1982, chap. 1) was the introduction of (at least) three levels of description/explanation. However, most contemporary research has relegated the distinction between levels to a rather dispensable remark. Ignoring such an important contribution comes at a price, or so we shall argue. In the present paper, first we review Marr’s main points and motivations regarding levels of explanation. Second, we examine two cases in which the distinction between levels has been neglected when considering (...) the structure of mental representations: Cummins et al.’s distinction between structural representation and encodings (Cummins in Journal of Philosophy, 93(12):591–614, 1996; Cummins et al. in Journal of Philosophical Research, 30:405–408, 2001) and Fodor’s account of iconic representation (Fodor 2008). These two cases illustrate the kind of problems in which researchers can find themselves if they overlook distinctions between levels and how easily these problems can be solved when levels are carefully examined. The analysis of these cases allows us to conclude that researchers in the cognitive sciences are well advised to avoid risks of confusion by respecting Marr’s old lesson. (shrink)

After the last very deep and intense investigations on Zubiri’s thought carried out in recent decades, this essay aims to contribute to make an assessment of the current state of the matter, examining several fundamental problems concerning human knowledge, which has been masterfully elucidated by the Spanish thinker: the question of truth and its modalities; the link between truth, knowledge and reality (the question of realism, types of scepticism and the question of hermeneutic). It is also about seeing the question (...) of the limits and possibilities from human Knowledge, attending to the articulation between human cognitive activity and the ontological structure of man (spiritual and corporeal at once). All of this is about seeing the achievements of Zubiri’s approach - placing his proposal in the context of the history of Western thought, and in particular, in the context of current thinking - emphasizing the possibilities it opens in the future, but its difficulties too. (shrink)

A basic introduction to the philosophies and practices of Buddhism as well as ways to incorporate them into daily life.

Subjects experiencing thought insertion disown thoughts they are introspectively aware of. According to what I call “the rationality hypothesis”, thought-insertion reports are not merely intelligible, but also express, or potentially express, fully rational judgments in the light of highly disruptive experience. I argue that the hypothesis is ethically and theoretically motivated, and provides two insights into the philosophical significance of reports by subjects with schizophrenia. First, the reports can be seen as evidence that rational judgments of ownership of a thought (...) prioritize agency awareness over introspective awareness of it. This point fits with an integrative account of thought insertion at the personal and mechanistic levels. Second, rational and competent uses of the first person purely based on introspection do not necessarily involve a full-fledged first-person perspective over one’s thoughts. This suggests that agency awareness, and not introspection as such, is primarily involved in determining the reference of the first person featuring in the judgments. (shrink)

In the light of partial (mis)understanding, we examine the thesis that concepts are individuated in terms of possession conditions and show that adherents face a fatal dilemma: Either concept‐individuating possession conditions include cases of partially (mis)understood concepts or not. If yes, possession conditions do not individuate concepts. If no, the thesis is too restricted and lacks a minimally satisfactory level of generalization.

There is an unresolved conflict concerning the normative nature of desire. Some authors take rational desire to differ from rational belief in being a normatively unconstrained attitude. Others insist that rational desire seems plausibly subject to several consistency norms. This article argues that the correct analysis of this conflict of conative normativity leads us to acknowledge intrinsic and extrinsic reasons to desire. If sound, this point helps us to unveil a fundamental aspect of desire, namely, that we cannot desire at (...) will. Unlike belief, however, desire can unproblematically accommodate a notion of instrumental attitude. (shrink)

Studies of individuals under conditions of confinement or severe social and physical restrictions have consistently shown deleterious mental health effects but also high levels of adaptability when dealing with such conditions. Considering the role of physical activity and sport in psychological adaptation, this paper describes a longitudinal study to explore to what extent the imposed restrictions due to the outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 may have affected athletes’ mental health outcomes and how far the process of adaptation to confinement conditions is differentially (...) affected depending on whether the sports activity was practiced individually or in a group, and outdoors, indoors, or both. Two hundred and seventy-four athletes were assessed over 7 weeks using the GHQ-28 and an ad hoc survey exploring the practice of physical activity. A mixed-model fixed effects ANCOVA was used to analyze the effects of time, place, and company in which the sport was practiced, with an index of the amount of physical activity expended as a covariate. Results show a significant effect of time in three out of four of the GHQ-28 subscales, in all cases showing a consistent adaptation to conditions over time. Results also show that playing sport indoors, outdoors, or both, and practicing alone vs. with others differentially affect the somatic symptoms exhibited during confinement: Athletes who practiced sport with others showed higher levels of somatic symptoms at the beginning of the set of data but a quicker rate of adaptation. Differences arising from practicing sport alone or with others were more pronounced in the case of indoor sports, which could be related to the fact that physical activity that can be practiced during confinement is more similar to that practiced indoors alone. Implications relating to what sport psychologists and other health professionals may offer to athletes in stressful situations are discussed. (shrink)

From Fodor and Pylyshyn’s celebrated 1988 systematicity argument in favour of a language of thought , a challenge to connectionist models arises in the form of a dilemma: either these models do not explain systematicity or they are implementations of LOT. From consideration of this challenge and of systematicity in domains other than language, defenders of connectionism have mounted a parallel systematicity argument against LOT which results in a new self-defeating dilemma, what I call here the systematicity challenge challenge : (...) either LOT does not explain nonlinguistic systematicity, or it is in no better position than its rivals to explain any systematicity, even linguistic systematicity. In this paper, first, I critically examine the SCC and some considerations that seem to support it. Second, I offer a response to the SCC by: showing that LOT was never meant to be a cognitive model restricted only to linguistic systematicity, and formulating a new argument in favour of LOT from nonlinguistic systematicity. Third, I argue that there is a central assumption underlying the SCC and maintain that it is mistaken. I conclude that the classical systematicity challenge continues to be fully valid for linguistic and nonlinguistic domains. (shrink)

According to a widespread, broadly Humean consensus, desires and other conative attitudes seem as such to be free from any normative constraints of rationality. However, rational subjects are also required to be attitude-coherent in ways that prima facie hold sway for desire. I here examine the plausibility of this idea by proposing several principles for coherent desire. These principles parallel principles for coherent belief and can be used to make a case for a kind of purely conative normativity. I consider (...) several objections to a principle for consistent desiring and reply to them. I conclude that, if attitude-coherence is a mark of rationality, the broadly Humean consensus must be rejected. (shrink)

Muchos autores consideran actualmente al efecto Baldwin (la idea de que comportamientos aprendidos pueden llegar a heredarse) como un potente mecanismo evolutivo. Sin embargo, su importancia deriva de la asunción neodarwinista de que la herencia es un mecanismo puramente genético. Desde una noción m..

This paper discusses Hubert Haider’s target-article “Grammar change: A case of Darwinian cognitive evolution”. I show why such an article is fascinating (and unconventional), although I will mainly concentrate on several disagreements with Haider and will suggest alternative views to those contended by this scholar. My discussion will highlight five main issues: (1) Haider assumes a purely Neo-Darwinian (i.e. genocentric) view of evolution and inheritance, lacking a more pluralistic approach; (2) Haider rejects the idea of language as a biological phenomenon, (...) while at the same time he seems to assume several characteristics related to a biologically seated trait; (3) as opposed to Haider’s suggestion, the computational system does not need to be language-specific; (4) Haider’s divide between the procedural and declarative components of grammar is perhaps too strict regarding (grammatical) change; and (5) Haider considers that there is no scientific way of deciding the question of language origins and evolution and that complex grammars are too recent. However, I show that a language-like computational power (and perhaps complex grammars) already existed many thousands of years ago. (shrink)

La humanidad ha comenzado a percibirse como una especie que podría enfrentar la extinción, y si ese será o no nuestro futuro es una cuestión que será definida por los conscientes o los dementes. Se argumenta que la principal ilusión del ser humano es seguir creyendo que somos seres inteligentes, cuando en realidad hemos estado atentando contra nuestras propias fuentes de sobrevida. Y se pregunta: ¿No hay en realidad una brecha tajante y profunda entre el ser humano dotado de esta (...) conciencia de especie y el que carece de ella? ¿No parece que se procrean en realidad dos especies dentro de un mismo gremio biológico? Postula el artículo como posibilidad optimista de futuro la conciencia de especie, una política que sea un “pacto por la vida” y una ética planetaria por la supervivencia. (shrink)

Se hace una apretada síntesis de lo que significa la crisis de la civilización industrial o moderna, a partir de una mirada histórica que contempla el paisaje completo del pasado humano y de la vida. Se plantea que el dilema central es entre tradición y modernidad, y que para remontar la crisis se requiere remontar el dominio del racionalismo, la dependencia de la energía fósil, el abandono al que se ha condenado al individuo y la fase corporativa del capitalismo. Se (...) identifica la construcción del poder social como la piedra axial de una ecología política verdaderamente emancipadora. Se concluye que las próximas décadas serán cruciales pues se habrá de vivir el conflicto supremo entre el mono demente y el mono pensante, entre los intereses particulares y perversos y la conciencia cósmica. De ello dependerá la supervivencia de la especie humana o su desaparición. (shrink)